Introduction
Looking at the economic literature one may distinguish two main categories of theoretical works on intertemporal preferences: those that consider an in…nite horizon and those that consider a …nite horizon. In between the two, however, lies an intermediate setting, which has barely been studied to date: the case of an in…nite possibility of …nite horizons. This corresponds to the case of agents who care for ‡ows of payments, which will stop after some …nite time, but whose stopping time is random or a matter of choice.
The most obvious case where such a setting is relevant is life cycle planning.
Human beings are indeed sure to die within a …nite time, but do not know when they will die. They have therefore to consider an in…nite possibility of …nite horizons. A number of other problems, however, such as …rm behavior, dynasty behavior, political modeling, could also …t into this domain.
The economic literature has not paid special attention to this setting because it is perceived as a particular instance of the in…nite horizon case. The standard argument is that a …nite payment ‡ow can always be seen as an in…nite payment ‡ow where payments equal zero after some …nite time. Thus, assuming an in…nite horizon would provide a general framework allowing to account for cases where payments have to be null after some …nite amount of time. However, the economic literature, in particular that on social choice, abounds with examples where it is found that working on too large a domain may well lead to too restrictive results.
The present paper provides an illustration of this general principle in the domain of intertemporal choice. We will indeed emphasize that considering the set of …nite payment ‡ows, rather than the larger set of in…nite payment ‡ows, makes it possible to derive new preference representations, with potentially important implications.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we will suggest an axiomatic construction of preferences based on very simple axioms: rationality, continuity, independence (in the sense introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern) and stationarity.
This will provide the foundations for widely used models (as with Yaari's model of intertemporal choice under uncertain lifetime) as well as suggest new speci-…cations for life-cycle preferences. In particular, we will underline the case of multiplicative preferences which provide a way to disentangle intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion, without abandoning the expected utility framework or the assumption of preference stationarity.
Second we discuss fundamental properties of stationary life-cycle preferences and discuss how they relate to what can be observed from choices of agents having an uncertain lifetime. We will in particular provide a formal decomposition of the rate of time discounting, explaining how pure time preferences, mortality and risk aversion contribute to human impatience.
Last, as an illustration we will apply our framework to life cycle consumption planning. The standard result, obtained when considering additive preferences and perfect credit markets, is that people with stationary preferences should opt for a consumption pro…le which has a constant growth rate (see Yaari, 1965) .
However, this prediction was contradicted by empirical observations, where it is found that the life cycle consumption pro…le is hump shaped. Allowing for temporal risk aversion, we …nd that Yaari's predictions do not extend to nonadditive preferences. The increase of mortality rates at old age together with a positive intertemporal correlation aversion may generate non-monotonic consumption pro…les -even when focusing on stationary preferences and considering perfect markets.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 discusses the related literature. 
Related Literature
The axiomatic construction of preferences developed in the current paper relies on an assumption of stationarity of preferences. Such an assumption was …rst introduced by Koopmans (1960) in a deterministic setting. It was extended by Epstein (1983) to the case of choice under uncertainty within the expected utility framework, and by Epstein and Zin (1989) to non-expected utility models. As our work …ts into the expected utility framework, our formulation of preference stationarity will be exactly the same as the one proposed by Epstein (1983) . We will also make use of the same recursivity arguments to provide an explicit representation of preferences. The originality lies therefore neither in the stationarity assumption nor in the techniques used, but on the fact that we consider a domain that is smaller than usual. As we will see, this explains why even if our results look similar to those of Epstein (1983) in some respects, they also di¤er in suggesting models that could not be obtained when considering in…nite horizons. Even if the idea of constraining consumption to be in a given state after a …nite amount of time has been used in several instances (starting from Ramsey, 1928 , could we say 1 ), we are not aware of other papers providing an axiomatic construction of preferences on the domain we consider.
One of the …ndings of the paper is that stationary preferences can have a multiplicative representation, making it possible to study the role of risk aversion, keeping intertemporal substitutability constant. As a consequence, our work relates to the literature devoted to studying the role of risk aversion in intertemporal frameworks, and in particular to Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) and Epstein and Zin (1989) . The relevance of these di¤erent approaches is now discussed in Bommier, Chassagnon, Le Grand (2010), who propose an abstract de…nition of what it means "to be more risk averse than someone else"and examines which classes of utility functions are well ordered in terms of risk aversion.
Since the preferences we derive are not necessarily time additive, we will often refer to the literature on multi-attribute utility theory. For example, the notion of "intertemporal correlation aversion"(ICA, hereafter), which is explained in Section 6, was discussed -under di¤erent names-in Keeney and Rai¤a (1976) , Richard (1975) , Epstein and Tanny (1980) , Dor ‡eitener and Krapp (2007) or Tsetlin and 1 Ramsey's assumption is slighty di¤erent as he considers the case where utility has to reach a given level -called Bliss-in a …nite amout of time or "at least approximate to it inde…nitely" (Ramsey, 1928 p.545 Allowing for ICA generates a signi…cant shift in life cycle modeling, in particular when accounting for lifetime uncertainty. Bommier (2006) …rst highlighted that the combination of ICA (or risk aversion with respect to life duration) and mortality risk generates time discounting, in a paper which focused on weakly separable preferences. Formal results on the rate of time discounting were derived, but only in the limit case where the value of life tends towards in…nity, so that additivity of the expected utility function could be recovered. One of the results of the present paper also bears on time discounting under lifetime uncertainty. Departing from the focus of Bommier (2006) , it applies to the whole set of stationary preferences (including those which are not weakly separable) and is independent of any asymptotic approximation. We will indeed provide a general decomposition of the rate of time discounting into elements that arise from pure time preference, mortality and risk aversion.
As ICA generates a strong link between mortality risks and impatience, opting for models with non-zero ICA provides new insights on a number of topics, such as the impact of mortality decline, the value of life or lifecycle portfolio choice.
These points are discussed in other papers: Bommier (2008) , for the impact of mortality decline, Bommier and Villeneuve (2010) for the value of life, Bommier and Rochet (2006) and Bommier (2010) for issues related to portfolio choice. 2 Giving up additive separability may also lead to new policy recommendations when there is asymmetric information. Such a point is addressed in Bommier, Leroux and Lozachmeur (2010), who consider the design of pension systems when agents have private information on their mortality.
There are actually many other applications that could be developed to illustrate the role of ICA. We shall only mention one of them in the current paper: the possibility of providing an explanation for the hump shape of life cycle consumption pro…les. In that perspective, the paper relates to the empirical literature that estimates the shape of consumption pro…les, as with Gourinchas and Parker (2002) or Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) . It also connects with those who suggested explanations for this hump shape (see for example Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber, 1999), and more particularly those who wondered whether mortality could be at the origin of this shape, such as Bütler (2001), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008) or Feigenbaum (2008) .
To end this Section we shall emphasize that this paper …ts into the literature on intertemporal choice under uncertainty, which has developed over several decades, providing numerous contributions that cannot be extensively reviewed here. The way our paper innovates in this domain is rather atypical, in the sense that we do not extend an existing framework. Many previous developments involved looking at what happens when relaxing some assumption. The literature on hyperbolic discounting on habit formation, or on rank dependent expected utility, are examples illustrating what can be achieved by relaxing some "classical" assumptions. Rather than following the same line, the current paper focuses on strong and standard assumptions, but innovates by de…ning preferences on a smaller domain. This is de…nitely not to mean that these classical assumptions should not be weakened in future works. On the contrary, it would be extremely interesting to consider non-stationary preferences or non-expected utility approaches. But, instead of focusing on extensions of the additive model, as has been done so far, one could also build upon the models that are suggested in the paper, and in particular upon the multiplicative model. In other words, while emphasizing that there are some interesting speci…cations which were not developed, though compatible with the most standard assumptions, the paper does not want to argue that departures from the "classical" assumptions should be disregarded. Instead, it aims at providing a di¤erent basis, upon which extensions could be developed. 6 
Setting
Time is assumed to be discrete. We are interested in the problems of agents who care for a ‡ow of consumption (or payments) but who know that, for some reason, this ‡ow will have to stop after a …nite amount of time. Speaking of life and death is probably the easiest way to illustrate our setting, but it is clear that our work does not exclusively apply to the modelling of human beings. It could also apply to …rms, dynasties, political parties or other sort of agents.
An agent will be considered to be "alive" when consuming a positive amount and "dead" when the consumption ‡ow has come to its end.
Formally, consumption is assumed to take values in R + and there is a death state denoted by the letter d : Thus, at any moment in time, the state of an individual is an element of the set:
Technically speaking, we could confuse being dead and having zero consumption.
This could however be misleading. We would indeed end up working with a connected, convex and ordered set X and tempted to impose standard assumptions of continuity, convexity or monotonicity of preferences. However, in many cases these assumptions could not relate to any sensible or plausible statement.
Think of human life for example: it makes no sense to think of a state where the agent is half dead and half alive. A lottery that gives one unit of consumption (x = 1) or being dead (x = d) with equal probabilities does not need to have a certainty equivalent. This seems clear when considering that death is not like any consumption level, while it could look counter-intuitive if we had arti…cially set d = 0. Similarly, with our approach, there may exist a consumption level c > 0 providing the same utility as death. The existence of such a consumption level, and its value, are determined by the agent's preferences and not imposed by construction. Had we arti…cially set d = 0; we would …nd that an agent could be indi¤erent between consuming c > 0 and "consuming" 0, which could seem odd, if one forgets that "zero consumption" actually means being dead -something 7 di¤erent from being alive and consuming nothing.
Considering (z i ) i2N 2 X N an in…nite sequence of elements of X, we shall say that (z i ) i2N is a "life" (or a "feasible ‡ow of payments") whenever it ful…lls the two following properties:
Property 1: (Life …niteness) There exist j 2 N such that z j = d: Property 2: (Death Irreversibility) If z j = d for some j 2 N, then z k = d for all k j.
We will denote by Z the set of lives, that is the set of elements of X N which ful-…ll the above two properties. Note that with this de…nition the sequence (d; d; :::)
is considered as a life. An important feature of this set Z is that it is stationary in the sense that (z 0 ; z 1 ; z 2 ; ::::) 2 Z =) (z 1 ; z 2 ; ::::) 2 Z This property is essential as it will enable the notion of preference stationarity to be de…ned (Axiom 4, introduced later on).
We denote by L(Z) the set of simple lotteries (i.e: lotteries with a …nite number of possible outcomes) with outcomes in Z: This set of lotteries is endowed with a mixture operation ; de…ned as usual.
Moreover, for any l 2 L(Z) and any c 0 in R + we de…ne c 0 l 2 Z as the lottery that involves consuming c 0 for sure in the …rst period and then living (and dying) according to the lottery l; delayed by one period. For example, if l is the lottery that gives (x 0 ; x 1 ; x 2 :::) or (y 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 :::) with equal probability, then c 0 l is the lottery that gives (c 0 ; x 0 ; x 1 ; x 2 :::) and (c 0 ; y 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 :::) with equal probability.
Assumptions
We now state the axioms that will lead to our representation result. Axiom 1 (Ordering) Individuals have a rational preference relation (i.e. a complete preorder) on L(Z).
We denote by the preference relation, the strict preference relation, and the indi¤erence relation.
Axiom 2 (Independence) For any l 1 ; l 2 , l 3 2 L(Z) and any 2 (0; 1)
Axiom 3 (Continuity) For any l 1 ; l 2 ; l 3 2 L(Z) such that
there exists 2 (0; 1) such that
Axioms 1 to 3 are the usual axioms of expected utility theory. As such,
they could be open to of discussion. A number of empirical and experimental papers have stressed that the independence axiom is probably too strong. Several theoretical frameworks have been suggested relaxing the independence axiom, as with rank dependent expected utility theory. It would of course be interesting to develop extensions of the current paper applying these approaches, but that is a matter for the future.
The last axiom expresses the assumption of stationarity.
Axiom 4 (Stationarity) For any c 0 2 R + and any l; l 0 2 L(Z) we have:
In a dynamic setting, the assumption of stationarity would imply that preferences are history independent and time consistent. Therefore, two individuals of di¤erent ages, say a 30 year old and 60 year old, would have the same preferences regarding their futures. That does not imply that they would behave in the same way. They would do so only if they faced the same constraints: that is the same budget constraints and the same mortality risks. In practice mortality strongly depends on age, and a 30 year old and a 60 year old are confronted with radically di¤erent constraints. Consequently, we expect them to behave very differently, even if they have the same preferences. greater ‡exibility. But it is also much more complex than expected utility theory.
In fact, most papers that use dynamic choice theory respond to this increase in complexity by assuming particular speci…cations. Instead, we prefer to remain in the simpler framework provided by the expected utility theory but consider all the speci…cations that are consistent with the stationarity axiom. 10 
The set of stationary preferences
As is known from Fishburn (1970) , Axioms 1 to 3 imply that preferences on L(Z)
have an expected utility representation, which means that there exists a function
where E l 1 [:] and E l 1 [:] denote the expectation operator associated with the lotteries l 1 and l 2 . In the following we will call U a utility index. Our …rst result provides the structure that this utility index must have for preferences to be stationary :
Proposition 1 Preferences ful…ll Axioms 1 to 4 if and only if they can be represented in the expected utility framework with a utility index U such that
where u and v are two functions from X into R; with u(d) = 0. 3
Proof. 1. Su¢ ciency
Consider two functions u and v from X into R with u(d) = 0 and the utility
. For any c 0 2 R + , and any l 2 L(Z) we have:
and therefore, for any l, l 0 and c 0 ; which, by convention, should be considered as being equal to zero. Such a convention will be used throughout the paper.
Similarly, for products, we will use the convention
11
Preferences are thus stationary.
Necessity
Axioms 1 to 3 imply that preferences admit an expected utility representation (Fishburn 1970 ). Let us denote by U a utility index associated with such a representation. As adding a constant to U does not impact preferences, it can be assumed without loss of generality that U (d; d; :::) = 0: Let us now show that U may be expressed as in (1) for some functions u and v.
For any c 0 2 R + and any l; l 0 2 L(Z), we know from Axiom 4 that:
With the expected utility representation:
For a given c 0 de…ne:
. Thus:
which means that V is another utility index representing the preference relation.
Since 
Extending the function u, which was de…ned on R + , to X by posing u(d) = 0 we obtain that for all
which proves the Proposition.
Before discussing this representation result and explaining how it relates to past contributions, let us give formal names to two particular cases that will be of special importance throughout the paper.
De…nition 1 Preferences will be called "additive"if they can be represented with a utility index of the form (1) with a constant function v. In such a case, setting = e v , equation (1) can be rewritten:
De…nition 2 Preferences will be said to be "multiplicative" if they can be represented with a utility index of the form (1) with functions u and v such that v = kw(c) and u(c) = 1 e kw(c) k for some constant k and some function w :
In such a case, equation (1) can be rewritten:
Now, let us discuss the interest of Proposition 1 and the novelty of our approach. A representation result that looks very similar was provided by Epstein (1983) . The similarity between Epstein's representation and ours is not surprising since both Epstein (1983) and the current paper deal with stationary expected utility preferences. The assumption of preference stationarity imposes a recursive structure to the utility index, as shown in equation (2), which leads to the general expression given in Proposition 1. 4 The di¤erence with the representation of Epstein (1983) , however, is that we do not have constraints on the function u and v; while in Epstein (1983) it is found that v must be positive and u and (1 e v )
should not be proportional. This is because Epstein deals with in…nitely long lived agents, which makes it impossible to obtain well-behaved representations where agents have no time preferences -as is known from Diamond (1965) .
The constraints on u and v in Epstein (1983) lead to ruling out the multiplicative model, which is precisely obtained whenever v = 0 or when u and (1 e v ) are proportional. However, the multiplicative speci…cation becomes possible in our framework, which accounts for the …niteness of human life. Multiplicative representations of preferences are not new to the economic literature. They were advocated by several theoretical papers (in particular by Richard, 1975 ) and used to deal with very concrete issues (Pye, 1973 , Ahn, 1989 , van der Ploeg, 1993).
But these multiplicative representations remained unpopular. When they were used in an in…nite horizon setting, they were augmented with an exogenous time discounting factor, and then explicitly disregarded for being non-stationary (see for example the discussion in Epstein and Zin, 1989, p. 951).
Our results emphasize that multiplicative preferences can be stationary. Moreover, they emerge from the set of stationary preferences as being of particular interest. First, as we will see, the multiplicative model appears to be one of the two polar cases that combine stationarity and separability, the other being the usual additive speci…cation. Secondly, the multiplicative model provides a straightforward way to separate intertemporal substitution and risk aversion within the stationary and expected utility framework. By increasing the constant k in the equation (4) that de…nes the multiplicative utility function, one increases risk aversion without changing ordinal preferences. The multiplicative model therefore makes it possible to analyze the role of risk aversion in intertemporal problems, without abandoning the expected utility framework or the stationarity assumption.
Properties of stationary preferences
The general form of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions that represent stationary preferences is given in equation (1) and deduces what their expressions turn out to be when the utility function has the form given in (1) . The meanings of u and v will then become clearer. The additive and multiplicative speci…cations will then appear as corresponding to fundamental assumptions.
In order to avoid technical di¢ culties we make two additional assumptions.
Assumption 1
The functions u and v that appear in equation (1) are twice continuously di¤erentiable.
Assumption 2
The functions u and v are such that for any life (z i ) i2N and any age t such that z t 6 = d we have:
Time preference is a familiar notion, usually measured by the rate of time preference. The rate of time preference at time t is usually de…ned from the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at two subsequent periods of time, when controlling for variation in consumption. More precisely if we take a life (z i ) i2N and time t such that z t 6 = d we de…ne the rate of time preference at time t by:
The rate of time preference simply describes how marginal utility of consumption varies along the life cycle when controlling for variations in consumption. With the utility index provided in (1) simple derivations lead to:
With the additive speci…cation, RT P t (z) = 1 , which explains the usual interpretation of : The multiplicative model provides RT P t (z) = 0; consistent with the fact that ordinal preferences, independent of k; can be represented by
The notion of intertemporal correlation aversion (ICA) is much less well-known, although it has occasionally featured in the economic literature, as mentioned in Section 2. We use the three words "intertemporal correlation aversion"to stress that it corresponds to a particular measure of correlation aversion that can be de…ned in the intertemporal framework.
Correlation aversion, which itself is not very well known, is a natural concept when looking at preferences over several attributes under uncertainty. It has been separately introduced, under di¤erent names, by de Finetti (1952) and Richard (1975) . The terminology "correlation aversion" comes from Epstein and Tanny (1980) . Basically, when considering preferences over bivariate lotteries, correlation aversion tells whether an individual prefers lotteries that exhibit a positive or a negative correlation. Formally, preferences over bivariate lotteries exhibit a positive correlation aversion if and only if, for all x 1 ; x 2; y 1 ; y 2 ; such that x 1 < x 2 and y 1 < y 2 ; the lottery:
is preferred to the lottery 8 <
:
One can de…ne a simple index of correlation aversion with respect to consumption at age t and consumption at age t + 1 by:
for all life such that z t+1 6 = d: This index is positive (resp. negative) if individuals prefer consumption lotteries at times t and t+1 to be negatively (resp. positively) correlated. Moreover, working along the same lines as Bommier (2007), one could relate this index of correlation to the amount of consumption that is necessary to compensate for a positive and in…nitesimally small correlation. 5 The expression that relates ICA to the functions u and v is very simple:
ICA is then equal to zero with the additive speci…cation, and positive when we consider increasing functions v.
ICA proves to be an important characteristic of individual preferences in a 5 In Bommier (2007) , the index of correlation is de…ned in a slightly di¤erent way and given by
Thus the formula of the correlation premium should be modi…ed accordingly. In the limit case where the length of the time period goes to zero, both de…nitions coincide. number of instances. For example, Bommier (2007) shows that ICA is simply related to the di¤erence between local measures of relative risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is thus natural to see ICA playing a major role for determining optimal …nancial strategies, as shown in Ahn (1989) , van der Ploeg (1993), for example.
Still, ICA is probably even more important when accounting for the risk of death. The point is that death is an irreversible event. Thus in the case of death at age t, the individual states at ages greater than t are all set to the "death" state. A bad outcome (z t = d) in period t is thus necessarily combined with a bad outcome in period > t. Since ICA re ‡ects the aversion for combining bad outcomes in a given period with bad outcomes in another period, we expect ICA to strongly a¤ect how individuals respond to the risk of death. But, before getting there, we explain how the notion of time preferences and ICA lead to draw a natural partition of the set of stationary preferences.
A typology of stationary lifetime preferences
Let us …rst express very simple facts that summarize in formal terms what appears from the analytic expressions that were given in the previous section. Some of these facts are well known and are discussed in Keeney and Rai¤a (1973) Proof. The …rst statement immediately follows from equation (8) . As for the second statement, we know from (6) Under assumption 1, this is the case if and only if u and h are proportional, which, by de…nition, means that preferences are multiplicative.
A simple picture of the set of stationary preferences follows from these three propositions (see Figure 1 ). In the following, a mortality pattern, that we will denote by the letter , will be a sequence of age speci…c mortality rates = ( t ) t2N . For all t 0; t 2 [0; 1]
is the probability of dying at the end of period t, conditional on being alive at the beginning of period t. It will be assumed that for all mortality patterns considered there exists some …nite time such that = 1. To any pro…le of mortality rates corresponds a distribution of the age at death t and a survival pro…le s t . The number t gives the probability that the agent dies at the end of period t. We have 0 = 0 and for t > 0:
The number s t gives the probability that an individual will be alive during period t. We have s 0 = 1 and for t > 0 :
Because we assume that there is always some …nite time such that = 1 the 20 sequences s t and t will be equal to zero after a …nite time. In practice, this guarantees that all the in…nite sums we consider below are well de…ned. Note that we have the simple relations:
which also implies:
In the case where agents face an uncertain lifetime, they make choices that will generate di¤erent "lives" (i.e. di¤erent elements of Z) depending on when they die. For example, they may have to choose a consumption pro…le c 2 R N + which, in case of death at age T; will generate a life z 2 Z given by:
For practicality we will denote such a life by (c; T ).
For any real function f (x; T ) that depends on some attributes, x; and on the age at death, T; we de…ne the ; t average of f (x; T ) that we denote E ;t f (x; :), by:
E ;t f (x;.) is simply the average of f (x; T ) when T follows the distribution of the age at death truncated at T t. For example, in the case where f (x; T ) is the age at death (that is when f (x; T ) = T ), then E ;t f (x;.) is the average age at death of the individuals that were alive at the beginning of period t:
Combining (9), (10) and (11), one readily obtains:
so that the ; t average of f (x; T ) can be expressed as a function of the survival probabilities, instead of a function of the distribution of the age at death.
Life cycle planning involves choosing a consumption path c 2 R N + , knowing 21 that, in the case death occurs at age T; this will generate the life (c; T ) and a utility:
When T is random, individuals aim at maximizing the expected utility, given the distribution of T; that is E ;0 U (c; :) given by:
Using (12), this can be rewritten as:
We recognize here a generalization -in discrete time-of the lifetime utility function suggested by Yaari (1965) , which is obtained when v is constant.
Local properties of individual preferences in the neighborhood of elements of L(Z) characterized by a given consumption pro…le and a non-degenerate mortality pattern can then be de…ned. For any mortality pattern and any consumption pro…le, we de…ne the rate of discount at time t by:
the intertemporal correlation aversion at time t by:
and the value of a statistical life at age t by:
@ @ct E ;0 U (c; :) :
22
Equations (15) and (16) extend the de…nitions given by (5) and (7) to the case where the length of life is not known with certainty. The value of a statistical life, V SL ;t , is nothing other than the opposite of the marginal rate of substitution between mortality at time t and consumption at time t. The terminology Value of a Statistical Life is consistent with that used in Johansson (2002) .
We can now express the following result:
Proposition 2 For any consumption pro…le, c, any mortality pattern, , and any time, t; we have
Proof. See Appendix B.
The …rst part of Proposition 2, which is a consequence of the recursive structure of the expected utility function (14) , indicates that the ICA age t is simply equal to the ICA when life duration is certain, and greater than t: Observation of ICA is therefore not complicated by the presence of mortality. Direct estimations of ICA can be achieved through simple experiments, as with those developed by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Ruström (2011). The same statement is not true however for the rate of time preference.
We can observe from equation (18) that the -rate of discount is the sum of four terms. The …rst one,
, is the harmonic mean of the rate of time preference. This term accounts for individuals'pure time preferences. In the case of the additive or multiplicative model, the rate of time preference is a constant and the …rst term is simply the exogenous rate of time preference. However, in the general case, the rate of time preference may depend on the length of life.
Equation (18) indicates that its harmonic mean is what matters when the length of life is random.
The second term is the mortality rate. It accounts for the fact that mortality creates a risk on future consumption. Consumption only occurs in case of survival.
The third term stresses the role of ICA. It vanishes when ICA equals zero, 23 and consequently has remained unnoticed in the economic literature that relies on time additive models to account for lifetime uncertainty.
Two parallel lines of argument can be followed to provide intuition about the origin of this third term. The …rst one sticks to the crude meaning of ICA.
Mortality generates a risk on tomorrow's consumption that is positively correlated to a much greater risk: the risk of losing life for ever. If tomorrow's consumption proves to be impossible, because of death, so will be the case of consumption at any date after tomorrow. Agents with positive ICA will react to this correlation by decreasing the risk on tomorrow's consumption: that is by consuming more today and less tomorrow. The magnitude of the reaction depends on the mortality risk, ICA and the value of the other items at risk (life, whose value is given by V SL ;t ). This explains the structure of this third term.
Another way of thinking about the third term of (18) The fourth term in equation (18) is an interaction term between mortality and pure time preference. This term appears because we work with discrete time, but would disappear in continuous time. In fact, when the length of the time period goes to zero, all the …rst three terms decrease proportionally to the length of the time period. For example if mortality rate at some age is x% per year -with x small-and we shift to monthly periods, we roughly get a mortality rate of x 12 % per month. The same is true with the rate of time discounting. The fourth term, which is the negative of the product of the mortality rate and the harmonic mean of the rate of time discounting, would decrease -in absolute value-proportionally to the square of the length of the time period. Shifting from a yearly time period to a monthly one, would lead to divide this term by 144, while the others would be divided by 12 only. As the length of the time period tends towards zero, this second-order term becomes negligible; it eventually disappears in the continuous setting.
If time discounting may be only partially driven by time preferences, the key question is how, in theory at least, we could identify individuals'pure time preferences. Looking at the role of mortality in Proposition 2 provides a solution.
Indeed, from equation (18), if we consider that the length of the time periods are small enough so that second-order terms can be neglected, we obtain that the rate of time discounting at age t is a linear function of t , with slope (1 + t V SL ;t ) and intercept
. 7 In absence of pure time preferences the elasticity of the rate of discount at age t with respect to mortality at age t equals 1.
If individuals have positive pure time preferences then this elasticity is smaller than one. More generally, a regression of the rate of discount at age t with a list of variables including the mortality rate at age t could theoretically provide estimates of both E ;t ( 1 RT Pt ) and t V SL ;t . The di¢ culty of the task should not be underestimated, however, since one needs to control for mortality rates at ages greater than t; which are strongly correlated with the mortality rate at age t.
Following this direction would thus require us to have simultaneous estimates on individual rates of discount, on the one hand, and mortality rates at all (present and future) ages, on the other hand. Proposition 2 makes it clear that ICA plays a central role when considering the impact of mortality. In the case where ICA is neglected (or assumed to equal zero) then equation (18) reduces to RT P ;t = RT P + t (1 RT P ). 8 In that case, mortality does contribute to the rate of time discounting, but, quantitatively speaking, when considering human mortality, the contribution is small unless considering people at old ages or with low life expectancy. Indeed, in a country like the US, average mortality rates equal 0.1% per year at 40 and do not reach 1% per year before age 62, and are therefore small compared to usual estimates for the rate of discount. When agents have a positive ICA (that is: t > 0), there is an another term, t t V SL ;t (c); through which mortality contributes to time discounting. This term can generate substantial time discounting, even if mortality and ICA are small, since the value of statistical life is usually estimated to be very large. 9 
Life cycle consumption
Allowing for non zero ICA signi…cantly changes the predictions of life cycle models and provides new insights on a number of topics. As mentioned in Section 2, applications bearing on the impact of mortality decline on aggregate savings, the value of life, the design of social security systems and on life-cycle portfolio choices are developed in other papers. We shall not return to these aspects, but focus on a simple issue related to consumption smoothing.
There is an on-going debate on the shape of the life cycle consumption pro…le, and how this can be rationalized. It is indeed found that the relation between age and consumption has an inverse U-shape, consumption increasing during the …rst part of the lifecycle and then declining. There is of course some heterogeneity in the estimates of this consumption pro…le, and at which age consumption is peaking, but the inverse U-shape relationship is quite robust. The literature also agrees that variation in household composition may partly -but not completelyaccount for the age variation of consumption. In order to have a plausible explanation, while relying on the standard additive life cycle model, one has to incorporate numbers of features, including imperfect (or inexistent) annuity markets and the need for precautionary savings. The particular role of mortality is the object of Feigenbaum (2008) , who explains that, in the absence of annuity mar-kets, mortality can indeed generate a hump shape consumption pro…le, but which does not match what is documented by empirical papers. Feigenbaum actually concludes that "mortality is an unlikely answer to the question of consumption hump" (Feigenbaum, 2008, p. 846 ).
The object of the current section is to discuss whether departing from the additive speci…cation, and opting for a model that allows for ICA, may provide an explanation for the shape of the consumption pro…le which was estimated empirical studies. More precisely, we will investigate whether the additive and the multiplicative models may generate consumption pro…les that match the one estimated by Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007). 10 In practice we consider the 1990 (male-female average) US mortality rates, 11 downloaded from the Human Mortality Database, and look at the optimal consumption pro…le of agents who have to allocate some exogenous wealth endowment having access to perfect credit and annuity markets. We do not model labor supply and/or retirement behavior. Though in presence of perfect credit markets, agents face a single budget constraint (expected lifetime consumption should not exceed expected lifetime earnings) and are therefore confronted by a problem which is very similar to the one we consider.
Given initial wealth (or lifetime earnings), 0 , agents have to choose a consumption pro…le solving:
where R is the gross return of the risk-free asset. The budget constraint accounts for survival probabilities since, in absence of bequest motives, agents should invest all their wealth in annuities, which provide a return R 1 t in case of survival, exceeding the return of the risk free asset, R. 12 We solve this problem for both the additive and multiplicative speci…cation.
We therefore compare what is obtained when assuming:
with what is obtained when:
For both the additive and multiplicative speci…cations we assume that agents have a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This means that u 0 (c) cu 00 (c) and w 0 (c) cw 00 (c) should be independent of c or, equivalently,
for some constants u 0 ; w 0 ; u and w . The constants u 0 and w 0 cannot be normalized to zero, as representations (3) and (4) already assume a speci…c normalization for the functions u and w, which must ful…ll u(d) = w(d) = 0. These constants u 0 and w 0 impact the welfare gap between being dead and being alive and consuming c. As such they are the main determinants of the value of a statistical 12 The period budget contraints can be written:
By iteration we get:
as stated in (19) .
life, for which we have empirical estimates to calibrate our models. However, as the value of a statistical life also depends on other parameters (and in particular of , k; u and w ), calibrations of the additive and multiplicative models have to be performed separately leading to di¤erent values for u 0 and w 0 .
In practice we will choose u 0 and w 0 so that an individual having a background In the case of the additive model it is well known that the solution to the optimization problem (19) involves choosing a consumption pro…le such that
Thus all combinations of the parameters that give the same value for R 1 u will provide the same solution. There is therefore an indeterminacy when trying to …nd the best …t with the pro…le taken from Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) . For simplicity, we shall therefore report the value of the optimal consumption growth rate, denoted g (the one which best …ts the data), knowing that for any u it can be obtained by setting equal to R(1 + g) u .
As for the multiplicative model, the optimization problem is complex, the expected utility function being non linear. No analytic solution can be provided and the results rely on numerical optimization. Lau and Ruström (2011) -both allowing for ICA-that estimate intertemporal elasticity of substitution in that range. In order to provide some idea of the our explanation's potential, we also run simulation where we constrain the elasticity of substitution to equal 1. For the multiplicative model, we still …nd a non-monotonic consumption pro…le, though with a smaller curvature than that of Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (Figure 3) .
Accounting for ICA may thus help to explain the hump-shape of the observed consumption pro…le. This should not be taken to mean that ICA and mortality might be the single explanation for the hump shape of consumption. In fact, there are some aspects, such as the low level of consumption before age 30, that models with ICA have di¢ culty in predicting, while they could simply result from liquidity constraints. The potential role of ICA should not be considered as a substitute for previous explanations based on market imperfections or precautionary savings but rather as being complementary.
It is worth emphasizing that preferences being stationary, the only source of variations in the predicted consumption growth rate shown in Figures 2 and 3 is the positive relation between age and mortality. This positive relation is what makes life expectancy shrink as an individual is getting older. In that sense, the hump shape of consumption obtained with the multiplicative model re ‡ects a pure life cycle e¤ect. We shall also note that the additive and multiplicative models, which are two extensions of the simplest model that assumes both a zero ICA and a zero rate of time preference, have the same number of degrees of freedom. Thus, if one turns out to have a better predictive power than the other, this is not the result of a greater complexity, but simply the consequence 30 of di¤erent underlying assumptions.
Conclusion
A general representation of stationary preferences was provided. Some particular speci…cations were also underlined as corresponding to additional assumptions on individual preferences (Figure 1 ). This naturally suggests several candidates for lifetime utility function. The simplest choice, and also the most restrictive, There are plenty of historical and technical reasons that could explain why life cycle theory did not explore the case of multiplicative preferences. In particular, the multiplicative model is an attractive option only when both the …niteness and the randomness of the length of life are accounted for. Therefore it could not emerge from studies that considered that the length of life was in…nite or known in advance. Moreover, although the multiplicative model is as simple as the additive one in terms of degrees of freedom, it is mathematically speaking less tractable. For example, while it is extremely simple to analytically derive the shape of the optimal consumption in the additive case (with perfect markets), it is impossible to …nd an explicit solution in the multiplicative case. The solution is closely related to mortality rates and can only be numerically estimated.
Opting for a mathematically convenient theory has an undisputable advantage: it makes economists' lives easier. But the cost may be high. There are many aspects of human behavior that are di¢ cult to explain with the additive model, while they seem rather natural when accounting for ICA. We discussed above a fact that was identi…ed as an "empirical puzzle": the hump-shape of life cycle consumption pro…les. But there are other issues that seem as important.
We end the paper by reviewing three of them.
The …rst one concerns the heterogeneity in discount rates. Women, rich people and non-whites (in the USA) are usually found to be signi…cantly less impatient than men, poor people and whites, the di¤erence in discount rates exceeding that ICA is a key element for modelling intertemporal choice under uncertainty.
The reason is that in many cases, agents are facing risks which have durable consequences (such as the risk of death, but also the risk of bankruptcy, etc. ). The time structure then ends up generating a strong positive correlation between what may happen at di¤erent periods of time, so that aversion for correlation appears to be central for evaluating these risks. The recursive speci…cation obtained in Proposition 1 and, in particular, the multiplicative model provide simple ways to account for ICA.
A Proof of Result 1
Using (3) and (4), it is straightforward to check that 1) 2. Moreover, 1 ) 3 follows from (6). 4 is explicitly weaker than 3 and, therefore, 3 ) 4.
Let us now prove that 2) 1. Denote: at time t is given by:
and therefore:
2 ) for any t 1 6 = t we have @RT P t @z t 1 = 0
But, by derivation of (6), for t 1 > t;such that z t 1 6 = d we …nd that
Assumption 2 implies that:
Thus, it is clear that @RT Pt
or v 0 (z t ) = 0: Therefore: 
It only remains to prove that 4) 1. Lets consider a life composed of constant 34 path at a level c, till an age T , after which the agent is dead. From (6) we have for all t < T : 
B Proof of Proposition 2
By derivation of equation (14), we obtain:
For t > 1, taking the derivative with respect to c t 1 leads to:
Equation (17) is just a reformulation of this result, with the index t 1 replaced by t:
In order to obtain equation (18) , let us …rst compute the expression of V SL ;t (c).
From:
one obtains:
Thus:
Using (22) and s t+1 = (1 t )s t ; we obtain:
We now have all elements to derive (18) . From (22) , applied in t and in t + 1, we have: Or again:
Now remarking that:
we …nd that the term (27) equals:
which is nothing else than t ;t V SL ;t . Substituting s t+1 st by (1 t ) in (26), we get:
RT P ;t (c) = 1 @ @c t+1 E ;0 U (c) @ @ct E ;0 U (c)
In a deterministic setting where people would die at the end of period T > t,
we know from (6) that:
Thus u 0 (c t )(1 e v(ct) ) v 0 (c t )u(c t )e v(ct) u 0 (c t ) v 0 (c t ) P +1 
which end proving Proposition 2.
As mentioned in the comments coming after Proposition 2, looking at how mortality at age t impacts the rate of time discounting at time t may be a way to identify time preferences and intertemporal correlation aversion. However, in order to do so, one has to account for the fact that both E ;t ( 1 RT Pt(c;:) ) and V SL ;t depend on t . The object of the lines below, is to explicit this dependence and to explain that this only generates second order-terms, when the length of the time period tends towards zero. From (23) and 1 s t = (1 t ) 1 s t+1 one can rewrite:
where ] V SL ;t , de…ned by,
is independent of t .
Moreover, using (10), (11), s t+1 st = 1 t and t = t st one gets: 
Combining (28), (29) and (30) we obtain: 
where all dependence in t is now made explicit (in the above expression, the terms E ;t+1 ( 1 RT Pt(c;:) ), RT P t (c; t) and ] V SL ;t are independent from t ).
The expression shown in (31) seems complex. However, it simpli…es when considering the case where the length of the time period is small. Indeed, when the length of the time period tends towards zero, the mortality rate as well as the rate of time discounting decrease proportionally to the length of the time period and many second-order terms, decreasing as the square of the length of the time period, can be neglected. Neglecting all second-order terms, we end up with a very simple formula:
where E ;t+1 ( 1 RT Pt(c;:) ) and t ] V SL ;t are independent from t .
Since E ;t+1 ( 1 RT Pt(c;:) ) E ;t ( 1 RT Pt(c;:) ) and t ( ] V SL ;t V SL ;t ) are also second order terms, we may write as well:
RT P ;t (c) ' 1 E ;t ( 1 RT Pt(c;:) )
This approximation is exact for the additive model, or when assuming in…nitesimally small periods of time.
Legend : 
